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Underclaiming and Overclaiming
Sachin S. Pandya and Peter Siegelman
Arguments that we have too much litigation (overclaiming) or too little (under-
claiming) cannot be valid without estimating how many of the undecided claims that are
brought (actual claims) or not brought (potential claims) have or lack legal merit. We
identify the basic conceptual structure of such underclaiming and overclaiming arguments,
which entails inferences about the distribution of actual or potential claims by their
probability of success on the merits within a claims-processing institution. We then survey
the available methods for estimating claim merit.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1995, four state attorneys general sent a letter to the New York Times to
champion legislation making it harder for prisoners to sue (Vacco et al. 1995). They
argued that prisoners, with "plenty of time and plenty of grudges," often filed meritless
lawsuits. As proof, they cited three prisoner suits as "typical": a suit alleging "cruel and
unusual punishment" for receiving a jar of creamy peanut butter, not chunky as
requested from the prison canteen; a suit complaining of "no salad bars or brunches on
weekends and holidays"; and a suit filed because the inmate wanted beige prison towels
rather than white ones. The attorneys general also pointed to a study of (non-habeas)
inmate litigation, which found that 94 percent of prisoners who file suit "win absolutely
nothing."
Aside from misrepresenting the allegations in the lawsuits they cited (Newman
1996, 520-22), the argument of the attorneys general had an important flaw. It did not
address the merits of legal claims that prisoners could have brought but did not bring
(their potential claims). For example, while the attorneys general conceded that cases
based on "sexual assault by prison guards . .. should not be dismissed or disregarded as
nonmeritorious," they did not address whether prisoners could and did actually bring
claims based on such assaults, or whether the prison litigation reform they backed would
make it harder to do so. (A 2008-2009 survey of inmates in prisons and jails estimated
that over 88,000 prison and jail inmates nationwide had suffered some form of sexual
victimization in the past twelve months [Beck and Harrison 2010, 6].) Even if many
actual prisoner lawsuits lack merit, that would not necessarily justify making it more
difficult for prisoners to sue if such reforms would also discourage meritorious prisoner
lawsuits.
In 2008, two law professors made a related mistake. Brake and Grossman (2008,
861) declared Title VII, the leading federal employment discrimination statute, a
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"failure as a rights claiming system," largely because Title VII's time-to-file rules and
rules against employer retaliation are too stringent, given evidence that most people
have a hard time perceiving or reporting themselves as having suffered discrimination.
Brake and Grossman's mistake was to assume, without proof, that such rules primarily
discourage or preclude otherwise meritorious Title VII claims. People often hold errone-
ous beliefs about the relevant law or the facts, making it unreliable to infer a potential
claim's merits from the potential claimant's perceptions. For example, many workers
believe that the law allows the firing of an employee only if the employer has a good
reason ("good cause")--even in jurisdictions where that belief is false. (For a review of
this literature, see Roehling [2002].) Similarly, even if people perceived themselves as
experiencing employment discrimination, those perceptions will not always match
what a court would decide, had those people brought and litigated their claims.
These examples concern errors that sometimes appear in a class of arguments about
how well courts, administrative agencies, arbitral forums, and other claims-processing
institutions (including informal grievance resolution inside firms) encourage claims
with merit and discourage those without it. We call these underclaiming and overclaiming
arguments. These arguments appeal to a particular view of how to judge a claims-
processing institution. We should not care about the raw number of actual or potential
claims that a claims-processing institution did or could have decided. We should care
only (or, at least, mostly) about those claims that, if brought and decided, would have
prevailed on their merits. If there are many perceived injuries, and thus potential
claims, but most would fail on the merits if brought, we should be glad that those
potential claims were never brought. Conversely, we should worry if many potential
claims with merit were not brought and decided, even if many meritless claims were.
The problem is that many underclaiming and overclaiming arguments assume, assert, or
imply, rather than prove, the merits of (actual or potential) undecided claims-that is,
how these claims would have fared had they been brought and decided.
This article identifies the conceptual structure of valid underclaiming and over-
claiming arguments. Such arguments entail inferences about the distribution of actual
or potential claims by their probability of satisfying the rules for deciding claims within
a particular claims-processing institution. The article then canvasses five research
strategies for estimating such probabilities, as illustrated with examples from research on
several types of claims, including employment discrimination, medical malpractice,
benefit applications, and insurance fraud. In so doing, the article contributes to the
subset of sociolegal research that is motivated by underclaiming or overclaiming con-
cerns, such as research into unmet "legal needs" (A. Currie 2006; Legal Services
Corporation 2009) and, as the above examples suggest, much of modern policy dis-
course about civil litigation.
As recent reviews of the sociolegal literature (Sandefur 2008; Kritzer 2011) indicate
by omission, this literature has not fully identified the unique analytic structure of under-
claiming and overclaiming arguments or the set of empirical methods appropriate for
testing them. Some prior work has recognized the need to consider underclaims and
overclaims simultaneously. For example, Saks (1992, 1169) motivated his review of data on
the U.S. tort system by asking how well that system compensated plaintiffs with "action-
able" injuries, including how much it failed to pay plaintiffs for "actionable" injuries
(underclaims) and how much it paid plaintiffs without "actionable" injuries (overclaims).
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Similarly, when some (e.g., Priest 1987) blamed excessive tort litigation for sharp
spikes in liability insurance premiums, Abel (1987, 447) responded by declaring that
the real tort "crisis" was a "crisis of underclaiming rather than overclaiming," in part
because many "tort victims" fail to claim. Proving this, he acknowledged, required
"establish[ing] the population of injury victims who could recover tort damages before
examining how many of them, and which ones, actually do so" (448). In contrast,
Brickman (2011, 120) concluded that "the concept of the meritorious claim is dubious
at best," either because it requires estimates of a tort claim's "probability of success based
on previous jury verdicts," which are "highly variable" and sometimes "defy rationality,"
or because judging a particular claim's merit is an irreducibly normative issue, requiring
"widespread agreement" on a set of policy goals and how well any decision on that
particular claim advances those goals.
Our chief contribution is to show precisely how underclaiming and overclaiming
can be objects of sociolegal study. This kind of work lies at the border between socio-
logical research on disputing (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980) and traditional legal
scholarship that aims to clarify the content of legal rules on the books. To assess the
merits of undecided claims, actual or potential, one must predict how a claims-
processing institution would decide them, given its decision rules. For legal institutions,
this sort of analysis sounds a lot like what lawyers are trained to do. In fact, however,
sociolegal research can contribute much to such analysis. Only sociolegal research can
help answer questions such as "Why do potential plaintiffs with meritorious claims fail
to bring them?" and "Under what circumstances do plaintiffs bring claims that lack
merit?" Ultimately, we hope to blur the boundaries between sociolegal research and
traditional legal analysis because both are necessary to understand how well the law
works in practice.
II. UNDERCLAIMING AND OVERCLAIMING ARGUMENTS
Underclaiming and overclaiming arguments entail inferences about the
distribution of actual or potential claims by their probability of success on the merits
within a claims-processing institution. By "on the merits," we mean the probability
that a claim, if brought, would satisfy a particular claims-processing institution's own
rules for deciding claims.
Figure 1 illustrates the basic intuition. Let I = the set of perceived injuries, C = the
set of claims actually brought, and M = the set of claims (actual or potential) with merit.
Underclaims are claims that, if they had been brought, would likely have succeeded on
the merits (= (I n M) - C). Overclaims are actual claims that lack merit. As Figure 1
depicts, underclaims and overclaims can exist simultaneously. This means that every
argument about the extent of underclaiming is incomplete unless it also estimates the
number of overclaims, and vice-versa.
We can further identify two types of overclaims. Overclaims, are actual meritless
claims where the claimant perceived injury (= In -M C). OverclaimS2 are actual
meritless claims, those for which the claimant perceived no injury (= -In C) but
nevertheless made a claim. By "injury," we mean simply an event that, under the
decision rules of the claims-processing institution, must have occurred for the claimant
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FIGURE 1.
Venn Diagram of Overclaiming and Underclaiming Arguments
to be eligible for a favorable decision. Every claimant asserts "injury" in this sense, and
the claims-processing institution must decide whether, under its decision rules, an
"injury" in fact occurred. For this reason, Figure 1 reflects a simplifying assumption: any
person who does not perceive an injury but claims that he or she has suffered an injury
has brought a claim that is unlikely to succeed on the merits.
This conception of success on the merits has two major implications. First, a claim
(actual or potential) has merit only with respect to a particular institution's rules for
deciding claims. Because those rules vary by institution and time, a claim's merit
necessarily varies by institution and time as well. Second, evaluating claims-processing
institutions requires assigning social values to each underclaim and overclaim. We
consider each implication in turn. We then contrast our approach with the dispute-
pyramid model. Despite that model's influence on sociolegal research, it does not
account for claim merit, and therefore cannot properly be used to test underclaiming or
overclaiming arguments.
A. Institutions
A claim (actual or potential) has merit only with respect to a particular claims-
processing institution's own rules for deciding claims. Claims-processing institutions
include not only courts, but also administrative agencies, commercial arbitration, work-
place grievance systems, and insurance claims departments, among others. For every
actual or potential claim, whether that claim has merit or not is a function of a set of
decision rules, which vary by institution and time.
For every claim that a particular claims-processing institution actually decides, we
can observe the decision, and thus whether the claim has or lacks merit. For every
potential claim that this institution did not decide, however, we have to estimate that
claim's probability of success as if that institution had decided it. For ease of exposition,
we call every undecided claim c (actual or potential) an overclaim if that claim was
actually brought and its probability of success is less than or equal to 50 percent
840 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
(P, : 0.50). We call that claim an underclaim, whether actually brought or not, if its
probability of success is more than 50 percent (pC > 0.50). (We might easily have
adopted different thresholds. We could have said, for example, that claim c is an
underclaim if p, > 0.75.)
This definition indexes claim merit to an institution's own decision rules,' because
underclaiming or overclaiming arguments usually attempt to sidestep disagreements
about the normative premises or implications of an institution's decision rules, instead
taking those rules as objective givens. In this respect, our definition differs from those
that treat claim merit as a function of researcher-created (external) decision rules that
are institution independent. For example, in some studies of closed medical malpractice
claims filed with liability insurers, the researchers (Gandhi et al. 2006, 490; Studdert et
al. 2006, 2026; Studdert and Mello 2007, S56) assessed claim merit not by reference to
a state's tort law governing negligence, but by using the Institute of Medicine's defini-
tion of "error": whether the adverse event suffered by the claimant was caused by "the
failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (i.e. error of execution) or the
use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e. error of planning)." The researchers stressed
to their claims-file reviewers that this definition of error is "not synonymous with the
legal definition of negligence and that a mix of factors extrinsic to merit influence
whether claims are paid during litigation."
This general approach-assessing claim merit using external criteria-has several
advantages. First, it allows researchers to compare actual or potential claim merit across
institutions with different decision rules. Second, for claims actually brought and
decided by an institution, the researcher can judge a claim's outcome based on how well
it accords with the researcher's external criteria. Thus, for example, one can treat actual
court decisions on medical malpractice claims as "wrong" if "wrong" is defined as the
failure of those decisions to match independent physician assessments of whether those
claims satisfy the Institute of Medicine's definition of medical error.
In contrast, by indexing claim merit exclusively to a claims-processing institution's
application of its own decision rules, the researcher is largely precluded from treating
that institution's actual decision on a claim's merits as "wrong." Moreover, where a
particular undecided claim has a nonzero probability of success on the merits in multiple
claims-processing institutions, there is no single claim-specific probability of success on
the merits; rather, a claim could be an underclaim with respect to one institution (for
which p, > 0.50), but not with respect to another institution (for which p, 5 0.50). To
be sure, once the researcher elects to study a particular institution, he or she can simply
ignore what that claim's probability of success is in other institutions.
In practice, however, many underclaiming and overclaiming arguments adopt or
imply a conception of merit indexed to a particular institution's decision rules and some
external criteria. For example, for every actual or potential claim c, the researcher, in
estimating the probability of the claim's success on the merits in a particular institution,
may choose to ignore the subset of that institution's decision rules that count as
"procedural." (In civil courts, such rules include statutes of limitation, filing deadlines,
administrative exhaustion requirements, and rules governing finality of judgments.) To
1. These decision rules include those for determining whether the claimant has suffered an "injury"
at all.
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identify that subset, a researcher can follow the institution's own rules for identifying
the subset of "procedural" rules,' or rely on some external criteria for what counts as a
"procedural" rule.
To illustrate, suppose a potential claim counts as an underclaim (p, > 0.50) only
if the researcher chooses to ignore the claims-processing institution's rule under which
the time to file that claim has already expired. If the researcher does not ignore this rule,
the potential claim's probability of success drops to zero (p, = 0), and thus would not be
counted as an underclaim. To decide which probability corresponds to that claim, we
must decide whether or how to identify the institution's "procedural" rules. That in
turn depends on the goals of the research. For example, it might be appropriate to ignore
that time-to-file "procedural" rule, and treat the claim as an underclaim, if the research
aims to find out how shorter or longer statutes of limitation affect claims-processing
outcomes.
Similarly, many underclaiming and overclaiming arguments also implicitly adopt
external criteria for estimating claim merit by assuming that the claims-processing
institution under study has certain features that in fact it may not have, such as an equal
opportunity to present evidence, decisionmaker impartiality, or a stable norm of treat-
ing like claims alike. Underclaiming or overclaiming estimates will be contested based
on how much disagreement there is over whether such features are in fact present and,
if not, whether they should be, that is, whether their presence is necessary for accurate
estimation of claim merit.
As an example, consider the operation of mandatory arbitration in employment
disputes. Critics have complained that arbitrators who are involved in more than one
case with a given employer are biased in favor of that employer. For evidence that the
critics may be right, see Colvin (2011, 15, 18). If repeat-play arbitrators are in fact
biased in this fashion, and if everyone agrees that, absent decisionmaker impartiality,
past arbitrator decisions should not count as decisions on the merits, then estimates of
claim merit based on those past arbitrator decisions will be contested as systematically
biased downward. This implies that in order to properly estimate claim merit for
employment arbitration, the researcher must estimate the probability of success on the
merits in a way that not only accounts for the decision rules in employment arbitration,
but also corrects for arbitrator bias against workers.
B. Claim Values
Underclaims and overclaims may vary in the value that society attaches to each.
The costs of an underclaim may include the foregone relief to people eligible for it, or
the reduction in future harmful behavior (deterrence), if any, that would have occurred
had the claim been made. Each overclaim may impose a social cost due to wasted
adjudicative resources, undeserved settlements, or, in some cases, taking away funds
2. For example, since Congress has prohibited the U.S. Supreme Court from prescribing rules of
procedure that "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b), the Court has had
to decide in many cases whether a prescribed rule is procedural or substantive, see Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1442-43 (2010) (collecting cases).
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TABLE 1.
Hypothetical Claiming Example
Merit Meritless
(Pa > 0.50) (p. : 0.50) Total
Perceived injuries 200 490 690
Claims 30 20 50
Claiming rate 15% 4.1% 7.2%
available to pay those who do have claims with merit.3 Indeed, much as some have
expressed tolerances for criminal justice system outcomes in terms of the ratio of
innocent persons jailed to guilty persons freed, we can judge claims-processing institu-
tions in terms of tolerable shares of underclaims and overclaims.
Yet, absent agreement on how to make the costs of underclaims or overclaims
commensurable, there is no justification for subtracting overclaims from underclaims
(or vice versa) in order to measure whether a claims-processing institution has too much
or not enough claiming overall.
To illustrate, consider the stylized example set out in Table 1. Suppose that, in a
sample of 10,000 people, 200 of them have a potential legal claim with merit (pc >
0.50). Suppose further that while all 200 of them perceive the injury associated with
their (potential) claim, only thirty (15 percent) actually make the claim, and go on
to prevail on the merits. Nobody else (the remaining 9,800 people) has a potential
legal claim with merit (so for all c in this remaining group, p, 5 0.50). However, 5
percent of this group (490) misperceive that they have a legally cognizable injury, and
twenty of them go on to make a (meritless) claim. None of their actual claims suc-
ceeds on the merits. The end result is that there are fifty total claims and 690 per-
ceived injuries, for a raw claiming rate of 7.2 percent. Conditional on a perceived
injury, the claiming rate for persons with a potential claim with merit is 15 percent
(30/200), while the claiming rate for those whose (potential) claims lack merit is 4.1
percent (20/490), less than one-third as large. This system has twenty overclaims (all
overclaimsi) and 170 underclaims.
Although the share of meritless claims among all claims is 20/50 = 40 percent
(which, taken alone, suggests substantial overclaiming), the proportion of meritless
potential claims is only 490/10,000 = 4.9 percent, which suggests negligible overclaim-
ing. Yet without prior agreement as to the social costs of underclaims and overclaims, we
cannot know whether we have too much or too little claiming overall. In the example,
40 percent of actual claims lacked merit (20/50), but 85 percent of potential claims with
merit (170/200) were not brought. (Unfortunately, this problem exists even if we
3. Policymakers might also infer from a large number of overclaims, that the applicable decision rules
do not match popular views of what those rules should be, which in turn may reduce the legitimacy of
institution outcomes. For example, the fact that many workers believe they have experienced discrimination
could be a problem, even if most of the discrimination claims actually brought by those workers would likely
fail on the merits. Such a mismatch, however, is not a social cost of overclaiming itself.
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measure claim merit continuously by letting the value of each claim vary with its
probability of success. We discuss this issue in more detail in the Appendix.)
Finally, attention to claim valuation resolves any complication that arises if a claim
is not decided by the claims-processing institution under study, but has been decided on
the merits by another claims-processing institution. To illustrate, suppose that a worker's
claim of race discrimination in hiring has a nonzero probability of success in multiple
institutions (e.g., state court, federal court, private arbitration), each with its own
(sometimes partially shared) rules of decision. The researcher estimates that, in federal
court (the claims-processing institution of interest), the claim's probability of success on
the merits exceeds 50 percent, and thus, for that institution, that claim counts as an
underclaim (p, > 0.50). The researcher then learns that, in fact, the potential claim in
question had actually been brought and decided in state court in the worker's favor (as,
say, a violation of a state statute). This claim is by definition not an underclaim with
respect to a state court because it was brought and decided in that state court. The
question is this: Given this new information, should the researcher still count that same
potential claim (i.e., race discrimination in hiring) as an underclaim with respect to
federal court?
The answer is that the researcher should continue to count that potential claim as
an underclaim with respect to federal court, but adjust the value of that underclaim to
reflect the degree to which society would have been better off had that potential claim
been decided in the institution under study (here, federal court). If society should be
indifferent as to whether the claim was decided on the merits in federal court or state
court, and if both outcomes would have been the same in any event, then we should
treat the underclaim as reflecting zero social loss. In contrast, by not counting it as an
underclaim at all with respect to federal court, the researcher makes a claim value
judgment implicitly that should be made explicitly.
C. The Dispute-Pyramid Model
Underclaiming and overclaiming arguments are distinct from the influential
dispute-pyramid model because that model does not purport to estimate the probability
of success of an actual or potential claim on the merits.
Developed in the early 1980s in the United States as part of the Civil Litigation
Research Project (CLRP) (Felstiner, Abel, and Sarat 1980; Miller and Sarat 1980), and
used in other countries (see Harris et al. 1984; Genn 1999; Murayama 2007), the model
represents the disputing process in terms of a population pyramid. While every injurious
experience (as defined by the researcher) could potentially lead to a lawsuit, only some
of those who are injured perceive that injury; only a subset of this group blame someone
for their condition; only a subset of those who blame someone for their condition
actively seek redress; only a subset of those who actively seek redress seek out a lawyer;
and only a subset of those who seek out a lawyer ever file a lawsuit or make a formal
claim of any kind.
The key fact about the dispute pyramid is that it narrows from a broad base of
potential claims to a much smaller peak of filed cases. For example, consider the set of
people deliberately injured by their spouses. If most of them believe that they, not their
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spouses, are to blame for their injuries, any private right of action for domestic violence
victims might only negligibly affect abuse rates because the plaintiffs needed to enforce
this protection never materialize. Since they blame themselves, they do not bring
claims against their spouses, and they fail to move up the dispute pyramid from some
early stage before formal litigation would have occurred.
With this claiming model, CLRP took the "dispute" or "case" as its unit of analysis
and compared disputes across several dimensions, including type of dispute, type of
disputant (individuals, organizations), and type of dispute-resolution institution
(courts, agencies, private arbitration, resolution without resort to a third party). In the
CLRP household survey, for example, respondents were asked if they had recently
experienced one of several predefined kinds of events. Then, in follow-up interviews,
those respondents were asked how they behaved, including, but not limited to, doing
nothing at all, talking to a lawyer, or filing a lawsuit.
By asking about claiming behavior conditional on a self-reported perceived
event, this approach captures potential disputes that would be missed by looking only
at court opinions or dockets. On the other hand, this approach omits overclaimS2,
which by definition occur absent any perceived injurious event. This approach also
cannot capture unperceived events that, because they are unperceived, cannot be
self-reported in surveys. For example, job applicants rarely know that they have not
been hired because of their race or sex. Yet, though legally prohibited, employer
surveys and audit studies suggest that employers commonly do hire on the basis of
race and sex (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Moss and Tilly 2006). Unperceived
events may also include bodily harms that are not immediately apparent. If years pass
between the time a company dumps toxic chemicals and the time a person who lives
near the dump site can be accurately diagnosed with cancer, that person will be less
likely to attribute his or her cancer to the dumped chemicals, even if the dumping
caused his or her cancer.
Most importantly, the dispute-pyramid model does not purport to help estimate the
probability of success on the merits of a potential claim. Nonetheless, some have based
overclaiming or underclaiming arguments in part on this kind of research. For example,
in arguing that many "tort victims" fail to claim, Abel (1987, 449-50) relied on, among
other studies, Harris et al. (1984), even though that study, following a variant of the
CLRP research design, did not in fact try to assess the legal merits of potential claims
arising from its respondents' self-reported injuries. While the dispute-pyramid model is
a valuable tool for understanding the way institutions process disputes, since that model
does not estimate claim merits, it is inappropriate for testing any underclaiming and
overclaiming arguments that are central to much policy analysis.
III. EMPIRICAL STRATEGIES
The rest of this article sketches the range of available empirical strategies for
estimating a potential claim's probability of success on the merits. With an unlimited
research budget, we could pay teams of private investigators to fan out and build, for
every self-reported injury, a dossier that provides perfect information about the actual
circumstances of the self-reported injury. In turn, that dossier could be handed over to
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panels of independent legal experts to score the claim's odds of success in court if it were
brought as a legal claim under every available legal theory. (Even this research design
would not capture unperceived injuries, or claims made absent perceived injuries, as, for
example, fraudulent claims.)
In the real world of limited budgets and human subject research protocols, there
are five basic strategies for estimating the degree of under- or overclaiming in a particu-
lar claims-processing institution: (1) retrospective estimates by experts; (2) contempo-
raneous estimates by situated actors; (3) inference from observable claim characteristics;
(4) field experiments or audit studies; and (5) inference from the characteristics of filed
claims. Each strategy starts with a conception of merit indexed to a particular institu-
tion's decision rules, and further assumes a set of institution- and time-invariant back-
ground conditions.
A. Retrospective Estimates by Expert Raters
In this strategy, researchers obtain access to routinely collected documents rel-
evant to a potential or actual claim, use independent experts to review those documents
to estimate claim merit, and score the expert's confidence in that estimate.
For an example of this approach, consider the Harvard Medical Practice Study
(HMPS) (Harvard Medical Practice Study 1990; Brennan et al. 1991; Localio et al.
1991). The HMPS researchers randomly sampled the medical records of patients dis-
charged in 1984 from hospitals in New York State. Medical record administrators
initially screened the sampled patient records. For each patient record that met one or
more screening criteria, two physicians independently reviewed that patient's record
and scored it on a six-point scale based on the reviewer's confidence that (1) the patient
had suffered an adverse event caused by the medical care provided, and (2) that such
care amounted to negligence.
The HMPS researchers operationalized negligence by asking their physician-
reviewers, for cases with adverse events caused by the medical care provided, whether
that event "was possibly due to a reasonably avoidable error, or carelessness by either an
individual or medical care system, or both." Reviewers were also asked to consider seven
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, including the "degree of deviation of treat-
ment from accepted norms," case complexity, and degree of "emergency in management
of case prior to occurrence of negligence." They were then asked again whether there
was negligence. If they thought that there was, they were asked to rate its severity
(slight, moderate, or grave) and estimate their level of "confidence in the evidence of
negligence" (Harvard Medical Practice Study, Technical App. 5.IV.1, Adverse Event
Analysis Form 1990, 10, 13-14).
By this method, the HMPS researchers identified 1,133 adverse events that
occurred during patient hospitalization (or during an earlier hospitalization or outpa-
tient care and discovered during that hospitalization). They judged 280 of these to have
resulted from negligence. After adding sample weights, the HMPS researchers estimated
that 98,609 (3.7 percent) of the patients discharged from hospitals in New York in 1984
suffered adverse events, and 27,179 of them (27.6 percent) were due to negligence
(Brennan et al. 1991, 371).
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The HMPS researchers then matched patients in the sample with medical mal-
practice claims filed with liability insurers and self-insured hospitals. They found only
forty-seven medical malpractice claims, from which they estimated that only 415 of the
adverse events caused by negligence (1.53 percent) led to a claim filed (Localio et al.
1991, 248). A follow-up record review found four additional claims, for a total of
fifty-one medical malpractice claims (Brennan, Sox, and Burstin 1996). This was strong
evidence of medical malpractice underclaiming.
Moreover, thirty-nine of the forty-seven claims originally found were ones for
which the HMPS physician-reviewers found no evidence of an adverse event caused by
negligence. Although this was a basis for inferring medical malpractice overclaiming, it
was only a weak one, in part because of the small sample of actual claims and because
HMPS-reviewer protocols for finding negligence did not precisely match the rules
governing how negligence and causation would be found in civil litigation (Localio
et al. 1991, 249; Baker 2005, 402-506). Although other studies of medical errors and
claiming have varied in their findings, what matters here is that the Harvard Medical
Practice Study illustrates the approach of using expert raters to estimate actual and
potential claim merit.
For this approach to be useful, two important conditions must be satisfied. First,
there must be a close match between the relevant rules of decision of the claims-
processing institution (e.g., the legal rules that a court would apply) and the criteria
with which expert raters judge claim merit. The HMPS researchers attempted to create
such a match, as did the Utah and Colorado Medical Practice Study, a similarly
designed study of hospital records in Utah and Colorado (see Studdert et al. 2000;
Thomas et al. 2000). That study defined "negligent adverse events . . . , in accordance
with standard tort criteria, as actual injuries proximately resulting from a treating
physician's failure to meet the standard expected in his practice community" (Studdert
et al. 2000, 252). Similarly, Cranberg, Glick, and Sato (2007, 156) judged closed
medical malpractice claims files concerning neurologists in the light of "the standard of
tort law," that is, whether significant patient harm was caused by neurologic care "below
the standard that would be expected of any neurologist under similar circumstances." In
their study of closed medical malpractice claim files for anesthesia-related patient
injuries, Cheney et al. (1989, 1599) judged the "overall appropriateness of anesthetic
care ... as 'that which met the standard of care for a prudent anesthesiologist practicing
anywhere in the United States at the time of the event' and judged inappropriate care
"as 'that below the standard of practice (i.e., negligence)'."
The validity of using expert raters depends in part on how closely such raters agree
with one another. To test the reliability of physician-rater judgments in the Utah and
Colorado Medical Practice Study, Thomas et al. took separate random samples of the
hospital records that, in that study, physician-raters had found to indicate "no adverse
event," "adverse event," or "negligent adverse event." They then subjected the sampled
records to a second and third physician-rater review. They found "moderate to poor
inter-rater reliability" (2002, 814). Adverse event rates were "markedly different"
depending on the minimum level of rater confidence necessary to indicate the presence
of an adverse event, or depending on the required minimum number of raters who
detected that event (814). For example, of the 161 files originally found to indicate a
"negligent adverse event," a random sample of fifty was subjected to a second and third
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review (815). When the researchers set the minimum rater confidence score at 2 (out
of 6), the negligent adverse event rate was 32.21 percent. That rate dropped to 15.13
percent when the minimum rater confidence score rose to 4. Requiring two of the three
raters to agree on a rating further pushed down the adverse event rate to only 4 percent
(814, Table 2).
In addition to the problem of interrater reliability, the expert-rater approach
requires a stable infrastructure of reliable record keeping in which data are routinely
kept for ordinary behavior, regardless of whether such behavior leads to any actual
claiming. Hospitals, for example, keep voluminous records of patient treatment and
health for all patients (not just those whose treatments they mishandle in some way).
Studies such as the HMPS thus depend on modem routines of making and preserving
medical records, the result of a shift to and standardization of the hospital patient case
file in the early twentieth century (Craig 1989-1990, 1990; Berg and Haterink 2004).
Few settings other than hospitals have a comparable infrastructure for producing reli-
able documentary evidence of both perceived and unperceived injuries. For example,
while any accidental injury motivating a hospital visit will generate records of both
injury and treatment decisions, it will not necessarily produce a police report. And even
if it does, police report classification of, for example, injury severity does not perfectly
match injury severity measures based on hospital records (Sciortino et al. 2005; Amoros
et al. 2007; Tsui et al. 2009, 86), suggesting that police reports are less reliable than
hospital records for studying how injury severity affects underclaiming of accidental
injuries.
Similarly, personnel files do not contain a complete record for every legally rel-
evant workplace event (e.g., a firing, promotion denial, or refusal to hire); neither do
they document what motivated the manager or co-worker responsible for the event.
Thus, where the issue is whether a person was fired not because of poor job performance,
but because of discrimination or other impermissible motives, personnel files will rarely
provide direct evidence of manager motivations or states of mind. Accordingly, since
the manager's motives are crucial to constructing a legal case for discrimination,
personnel records alone are usually inadequate for assessing the merits of a worker's
discrimination claim. By contrast, the evidence required to establish medical negligence
does routinely appear in medical records.
The absence of relevant evidence makes causal inference (and thus claim merit
estimation) more difficult. For example, Zwerling and Silver used an employer's com-
plete personnel records to estimate a model of the factors leading to employee firing.
Even after controlling for all variables in the employer's files, they concluded that there
was a racial disparity in firing rates. However, when they asked an independent human
resources manager to review the files, he found no "inappropriate" firings in the records
he reviewed, though eleven firings presented "unclear documentation for the precise
reason for the discharge" (1992, 658). Zwerling and Silver suggested that a kind of
favoritism might partly explain their results: all firings were legitimate, regardless of
race, but some whites were not fired for offenses that would have led to their termination
had they been black. While this inference is plausible, the problem is that the files on
which the authors relied did not contain evidence of all workers' behavior, so it is
impossible to know whether there were in fact white workers who misbehaved but
whose offenses were never recorded in their files.
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B. Contemporaneous Estimates by Situated Actors
Another strategy for estimating claim merits relies on documents containing the
contemporaneous estimates of claim merit by actors who routinely make such judg-
ments and, in theory, have strong incentives to make accurate estimates. Accordingly,
liability insurance claims files should contain claims adjuster estimates of claim settle-
ment costs. The files of a plaintiffs lawyer may contain an estimate of the odds of the
potential lawsuit's success. Administrative agency staff files of citizen complaints may
contain staff estimates of merits for purposes of deciding which complaints to investi-
gate or litigate.
Using this strategy to evaluate claim merits has several drawbacks. First, it will
underestimate underclaims. A person needs to have already complained to attract the
attention of the merit evaluators. Second, in predicting claim merits, these actors may
consider other factors that the researcher may want to treat as irrelevant to claim merits
(e.g., the effect of "procedural" rules).
Third, some institutional actors estimate merit based on a claim's expected mon-
etary value, without expressly disaggregating odds of liability from expected damages.
So, for example, a claims adjuster may indicate in a claims file how much to set aside in
reserve for a claim that has been filed but not decided, but that adjuster may not
indicate the express reasoning behind the amount reserved. A high reserve equally
indicates a large probability of winning a small amount or a small probability of winning
a very large amount, whereas only the former case may have merit by our definition (if
PC > 0.50).
Fourth, even when they do express judgments of claim merit, insurers, attorneys,
and others typically do so using categorical variables that take only a few values. For
example, Phillips Jr. et al. (2004, 122) relied on pooled medical malpractice claims
data from multiple insurers in which an insurer's physicians had reviewed the file and
judged whether there had been medical negligence and whether the claim was
"defensible" or "indefensible." Similarly, Taragin et al. (1992, 780-81) relied on judg-
ments by physicians and claims adjusters in the claims files of a physician-owned
insurance company to classify the claim as "indefensible-insured admits deviation,"
"no peer review-clearly defensible," "defensible," "indefensible," or "defensibility
unclear."
Fifth, there is the task of establishing whether these contemporaneous estimates
are valid and reliable. For example, Ross (1980, 98-101) observed how, rather than
undertaking the complex inquiry required by the negligence law on the books, the auto
insurance claims adjusters he interviewed routinely assumed that in rear-end collision
claims, the driver of the striking vehicle is liable for negligence. To be sure, this rule of
thumb may validly predict what would happen if those rear-end collision cases were
decided in court on the merits. On the other hand, to the extent that claims adjuster
evaluations depend on factors other than the merits (such as the cyclical behavior of the
insurance market), this approach will be subject to bias. Even lawyer predictions of
litigation outcomes are subject to overconfidence and optimism bias (Goodman-
Delahunty et al. 2010). Moreover, based on four case studies of medical malpractice
claims that went to trial, Vidmar (1995, 67) suggests that "there is often a great deal of
uncertainty in the process [of litigating medical malpractice cases]," so that attorney
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"estimates of case strength may reverse ... at any time as ... more information is
uncovered."
As an example of the problems confronting researchers who rely on estimates of
claim merits made by situated actors, consider the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), a federal administrative agency. Most federal employment dis-
crimination laws require filing discrimination charges with the EEOC as a precondition
for bringing a lawsuit, and mandate the EEOC to identify whether filed charges of
discrimination have "reasonable cause." Pursuant to that mandate, the EEOC, since
1995, has assigned priority to each new charge filed by coding it A, B, or C. Category A
covers "charges that fall within the [EEOC's] national or local enforcement plan,"
charges "where further investigation will probably result in a cause finding," or charges
for which "irreparable harm will result unless processing is expedited." Category C covers
charges for which the agency "has sufficient information from which to conclude that it
is not likely that further investigation will result in a cause finding." Category B covers
charges that "initially appear to have some merit but will require additional evidence to
determine whether continued investigation is likely to result in a cause finding." After
further investigation, the EEOC instructs agency staff to recode these charges as either
A or C (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1995, 405:7313).
Ullman et al. found that for all Americans with Disabilities Act charges filed with
the EEOC between June 1995 and March 1998, charges involving anxiety, depression,
and manic-depression were less likely to be coded as Category A than those that did not
involve those issues (2001, 648). The authors suggested several explanations for this
finding. One was that there were real differences of merit between the ADA cases that
did involve these psychiatric issues and those that did not. Another was that "stereo-
types or stigma" about psychiatric conditions influenced agency staff, merits notwith-
standing (648). Still another was that claimants with these psychiatric conditions
are less able to clearly articulate their discrimination allegations in the charges they
file, which affects the way agency staff members assign preinvestigation priority codes
(648-49).
Testing these explanations requires validating whether EEOC staff assign priority
codes in accordance with the available information on claim merit. One way to test
these explanations would be to take a sample of EEOC charge files, have independent
expert raters (e.g., employment lawyers) code them using the EEOC priority codes, and
test for agreement with the previously assigned EEOC code for each file.
Another approach might use hypothetical vignettes to capture the set of circum-
stances that influence the way EEOC staff assign priority codes. In vignette studies,
researchers present respondents with a short hypothetical scenario and ask them to
judge whether the law permits or prohibits the conduct described therein (York 1989;
Schmedemann and Parks 1994; Kim 1997, 1999). This method has long been used in
social research (Herskovits 1950). In a more sophisticated variant, the factorial survey,
researchers systematically vary some aspects of the facts presented in each vignette,
allowing them to discover which facts influence respondents' judgments (Jasso 2006;
Wallander 2009).
Still another approach is to match EEOC charges with subsequent litigation, and
compare the assigned EEOC priority codes with subsequent litigation outcomes. For
example, from a random sample of employment civil rights cases filed in federal court
850 LAW & SOCIAL INQUIRY
between 1988 and 2003, Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster (2010, 191) matched the
EEOC priority codes for those cases with case outcomes, and concluded, based on a
discrete hazard model, that the priority codes "had little explanatory effect" on the
probability that a case would end because of dismissal, early settlement (prior to motion
for summary judgment), plaintiff loss at summary judgment, or post-summary-judgment
settlement. In particular, they found no statistically significant effect of EEOC priority
codes A and C on the probability of each of those case outcomes (186). "The only
statistically significant effect that EEOC priority codes have is that B cases are more
likely to obtain early settlement than other cases" (191).'
Administrative agency estimates also raise the particular problem that agency staff
may prioritize complaints based on considerations other than the apparent merit of the
complaint. Some agencies select complaints for investigation and litigation to advance
an agenda to move "the law" in a particular direction. For example, EEOC priority code
A applies not only to charges that are likely to result in a "reasonable cause" finding, but
also to charges that fall within the EEOC's national enforcement plan. That plan
identifies as enforcement priorities cases that may "promote the development of law
supporting the antidiscrimination purposes of the statutes" that the agency enforces,
such as claims presenting certain "unresolved issues of statutory interpretation" under
one or more of those statutes (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 1996,
405:7354). In other words, the agency may decide to litigate a case to persuade a court
or other decisionmaker to change the underlying legal decision rules under which its
odds of success are currently poor or uncertain. In sum, the agency's ranking may well
reflect in part its own priorities, rather than being simply a guess about the charge's
actual merits under current law.
C. Inference from Observable Claim Characteristics
This strategy relies on a close correlation between claim merit and easily observ-
able or self-reported characteristics of potential and actual claims. To illustrate this
strategy, we consider research on (1) the "take-up" of social benefits, (2) sexual harass-
ment, and (3) insurance fraud.
1. The "Take-Up" Rate of Social Benefits
Researchers such as J. Currie (2006), Orbach (2006), Remler and Glied (2003),
and Craig (1991) describe the extent to which people do not apply for a benefit (e.g.,
unemployment insurance, Medicaid) for which they are eligible by calculating a "take-
up" rate for that benefit. A take-up rate requires a numerator-typically the number of
4. It may be that the EEOC codes are valid and reliable estimates of claim merit, given the information
available at the time the EEOC staff assigned those codes. During subsequent litigation, lawyer investment
in fact finding and civil discovery may increase information about a case's merits. If so, we should expect
substantial differences between estimates of a claim's odds of success based only on information in the EEOC
charge file and such estimates at different stages of actual litigation.
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people who actually received the benefit-and a denominator-the total number of
people who are eligible to receive the benefit. For that denominator, since legal rules set
the conditions for eligibility, researchers need data indicating the presence or absence
of the eligibility conditions when they sample for benefit-eligible persons (or classify
persons in an already drawn sample as benefit eligible).
These studies assume that by applying the algorithm defined by the eligibility rules,
the researchers can predict the outcome of any individual application for benefits. The
benefit-granting institution would more likely than not grant benefits (p, > 0.50) for
those who meet the eligibility formula, and is more likely than not to deny benefits (p,
< 0.50) for those who do not. Such studies often go on to model claiming processes, and
to estimate the degree to which such variables as stigma, application process complexity,
and benefit size affect benefit take-up (Kerr 1982; Moffitt 1983; Duclos 1995). In
general, these studies conclude that take-up rates are substantially less than 100 percent
among those eligible, which constitutes evidence of significant underclaiming.
As benefit eligibility criteria become more complex, researchers must work harder
to provide an accurate specification of the benefit-eligible class, especially if eligibility
criteria diverge from self-reported characteristics in household survey data. Examples of
more complex eligibility rules include those governing Social Security Disability Insur-
ance (SSDI) benefits (Dwyer et al. 2003), "medical need" under Medicaid (Ettner
1997), and workers' compensation benefits (Shannon and Lowe 2002).
In some studies, researchers combine survey self-reports with administrative
agency data on filing and benefit decisions. This approach permits some estimate of the
bias of survey self-reports as eligibility measures. For example, Benitez-Silva et al.
studied, from a large panel survey of older individuals about their health and retirement,
a subsample of individuals who self-reported disability status and applied for SSDI
benefits or Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits (2004, 650, 654). Comparing
the survey self-reports of disability status with the way the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA) actually decided the respondents' benefit applications, they found that
roughly 15 percent of the people in their subsample reported no disability but still
collected benefits, while roughly 18 percent self-reported that they were disabled but
were denied benefits (651, Table 1). Nevertheless, Benitez-Silva et al. concluded that
the disability self-reports were an unbiased estimator of the ultimate SSA eligibility
decision because "overall, the individual's assessment of their own health condition
matches that of the SSA" (650). However, since this study did not randomly sample
SSDI or SSI applicants, its subsample may not be representative of all such applicants.
The take-up rate literature does not typically estimate overclaims, and therefore its
findings do not rule out at least some overclaiming of benefits. For example, based on
data from a computerized system that identified discrepancies between AFDC and Food
Stamp recipients' self-reported earnings and employer-reported wage records, which in
turn triggered fraud investigations, Wolf and Greenberg (1986, 452) estimated that only
2 to 3 percent of the average combined Food Stamp and AFDC caseloads in two New
Jersey counties between January 1981 and March 1981 involved fraudulent underre-
porting of earnings. Another example: In randomized trials involving unemployment
insurance (Ul) claimants at sites in four states (Connecticut, Massachusetts, Virginia,
and Tennessee), Ashenfelter, Ashmore, and Deschenes randomly subjected UI claim-
ants to "a number of additional verifications of initial and continuing eligibility" before
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the relevant state agency issued the first UI payment to them (2005, 56). This resulted
in about a 3 percent overall reduction in the overall benefit qualification rate for the
claimants, "mainly reflecting [a] large 8% reduction in Connecticut" (67), which
suggests some limited UI overclaiming.
2. Sexual Harassment
Sexual harassment research often asks survey respondents to rate their experiences
in terms of the severity of the harassment, which ranges from verbal statements with
sexually explicit content to actual physical assault (Antecol and Cobb-Clark 2004;
Blackstone, Uggen, and McLaughlin 2009). To hold an employer liable for workplace
sexual harassment under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, an employee must show
employer-attributable conduct that is "severe or pervasive" enough that "a reasonable
person would find [it] hostile or abusive," as determined by factors including the
frequency and severity of underlying conduct; "whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with
an employee's work performance" (Harris v. Forklift Systems 1993).
Accordingly, the more sensitive the survey instrument is to the severity of the
respondents' self-reported experiences, the better one can predict respondents' odds of
success on any Title VII sexual harassment claim they might bring. Where studies
collect data on respondent responses to the alleged harassing behavior (from doing
nothing to complaining to a supervisor to filing a lawsuit), they also provide a rough
starting point for estimating the number of sexual harassment underclaims.
To move past this starting point, however, the studies must have also collected
other data relevant to the way the claims-processing institution in question would
decide the claim. For example, suppose a survey respondent clearly suffered an experi-
ence that would satisfy the underlying decision rule about what constitutes sexual
harassment under Title VII. Even if the respondent did not complain about the conduct
in question, however, her potential Title VII suit might nevertheless not count as an
underclaim (p < 0.50) because Title VII affords a defense against some kinds of sexual
harassment liability if the employer provided, but the aggrieved worker did not pursue,
an internal grievance procedure for responding to sexual harassment (Faragher v. City of
Boca Raton 1998).
3. Insurance Fraud
Research on insurance fraud amounts to estimating the number of overclaims 2
processed by a particular kind of institution, namely, insurers' claims departments. Such
estimates are based on observing the characteristics of insurance claims and comparing
them to those of verified instances of insurance fraud.
Verified instances of insurance fraud are easy to find. For example, in In re Silica
Products Liability Litigation (S.D. Tex. 2005), a district court found that 111 claims of
silicosis-involving roughly 10,000 individuals-were based on diagnoses that were
"manufactured for money," pursuant to a scheme in which "lawyers, doctors, and
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screening companies were all willing participants" (635). For another example, Dorn-
stein (1998, ch. 6) discusses the "Friends of the Friendless," a large and sophisticated
fraudulent auto accident enterprise in southern California, involving several doctors
and lawyers.
It is much harder, however, to find out how often insurance fraud occurs. Imagine
asking a survey respondent, "Did you ever file a claim for an injury that you did not
suffer?" or "Have you ever exaggerated the severity of an injury you did experience?"
Answers to such questions would likely be unreliable. Indeed, since intentional over-
claimers presumably try to avoid detection, prevalence estimates based on detected
overclaims2 are likely to be biased downward. Reviewing the social science literature on
insurance fraud, Tennyson concludes that although "conventional wisdom often esti-
mates the prevalence of insurance claims fraud at about 10 percent of claims, . . . this
statistic appears to be more folk wisdom than fact" (2008, 1184).
In a sophisticated study, Caron and Dionne (1999) estimate how often auto
insurance fraud occurs based on insurer data on suspected fraud in a sample of 2,509
randomly investigated claims files in the Quebec auto insurance industry. Using an
ingenious statistical technique that allows for simultaneous estimation of the detection
rate and the underlying fraud or overclaiming 2 rate, they estimate that roughly 12
percent of all claims involve some kind of fraud, of which insurers detect only about
one-third. If they generalize, these results suggest that even trained investigators catch
only a small proportion of overclaimS2, so existing estimates may indeed have a down-
wards bias.
Insurance companies often attempt to detect fraudulent auto insurance claims
(overclaimS2) by generating suspicion scores based on claim characteristics that have
been closely correlated with insurance fraud in past cases. For example, Dornstein
quotes insurance industry trade literature from 1979 that offer a rough list of slip-and-
fall fraud indicators: "Claimant is a transient or out-of-towner on vacation"; "Claimant
is overly pushy and demanding for a quick settlement"; "Typical defrauder will claim
that as a result of his fall, he suffered personal injury, lost time from work, and broke his
eyeglasses, dentures, or other expensive props, such as cameras or wristwatches" (1998,
267).
More sophisticated versions of this kind of checklist are based on mathematical
techniques that combine information on attributes of a claim that are statistically
associated with suspected fraud (Weisberg and Derrig 1991). For example, Brockett,
Xia, and Derrig (1998) use sixty-five indicator ("yes/no") variables to predict the
presence of fraud by means of an artificial intelligence technique based on neural
networks. Insurers rarely, if ever, decisively verify the existence of fraud by bringing
suspected claims before a court for an official determination that fraud has occurred (but
see Artfs, Ayuso, and Guillkn 2002). That would require extensive investigation and
legal procedures, both of which are extremely expensive. Instead, they classify claims as
"suspicious" based on the ratings of experienced claims adjusters. They then use statis-
tical techniques to discover which attributes of a claim predict the adjusters' suspicion
of fraud, rather than predicting actual (verified) instances of fraud itself. If this is indeed
their approach, insurers' fraud detection methods are ultimately no better at capturing
overclaiming than self-report survey studies are as measures of underclaiming. In
neither case are merit estimates verified by independent investigation.
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D. Field Experiments or Audit Studies
Field experiments (such as audits) are one of the best ways to measure under-
claims. To illustrate, under laws prohibiting discrimination in labor, housing, and
product markets, the merit of a claim of discrimination often turns on the strength of
the inference that someone was treated worse than they would have been had they
been of a different race or sex. Since this counterfactual cannot be observed directly,
job applicants or those seeking to rent an apartment often find it impossible to detect
the presence of discrimination. Someone who is turned down for a job will typically
lack any information about the employer's hiring decision, and will thus be unable to
infer why he or she was not hired. Survey or interview methods face the same
problem. Asking survey respondents whether they have experienced discrimination
is unlikely to produce accurate answers when the discrimination is difficult to
detect.
For over forty years, some researchers have turned to field experiments to try to
surmount this problem (Raich and Rich 2002). They send out pairs of individuals to
apply for jobs or mortgages, or seek to buy homes, cars, or cups of coffee, among other
things. Then, they compare how the pairs were treated. If A and B are "identical"
except for race; both apply for the same jobs; and A is systematically offered a job more
often than B is, this is a strong basis to infer illegal race discrimination against B. To be
sure, at any particular employer, A might randomly receive more favorable treatment
than B, or vice-versa. Thus, audit studies, if properly implemented, provide good
evidence of aggregate (net) discrimination against one or the other group, although
without conclusively demonstrating discrimination in any particular encounter
(Heckman and Siegelman 1993, 187).
Audit studies of this kind have been used to detect discrimination in many
situations, including employment (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Pager, Boni-
kowski, and Western 2009; Carlsson 2010), housing (Ondrich, Ross, and Yinger 2000),
auto sales (Ayres and Siegelman 1995), and waiting times at a retail coffee seller (Myers
et al. 2008), as well as tipping by taxicab riders (Ayres, Vars, and Zakariya 2005) and by
restaurant customers (Lynn et al. 2008). They typically show that in the aggregate,
discrimination occurs often in all these contexts. Yet, virtually no anti-discrimination
lawsuits are filed against discriminatory tipping practices. Hiring discrimination is also
litigated relatively rarely (Nielsen, Nelson, and Lancaster 2010), as is housing discrimi-
nation. In these contexts, therefore, there are likely to be claims with merit that are
never brought, making a persuasive case for at least some underclaiming. Of course, it
may be that even though nobody brings meritorious hiring discrimination claims, those
hiring discrimination claims that are brought nevertheless lack merit. The audit evi-
dence does not rule out some overclaiming, although net overclaiming seems highly
unlikely.
Field experiments can detect other kinds of illegal behavior as well. For example,
by sending cars in need of specific predetermined repairs to various auto mechanics,
researchers can detect the incidence of unnecessary repairs as well as incidence of
undiagnosed (but needed) repairs. Using this strategy, Schneider (forthcoming) found
that roughly one-third of all mechanics recommended unnecessary repairs. A similar
strategy uncovered substantial fraud in television repair (Phelan 1974). If almost no
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one files claims based on improperly performed repairs, we can infer substantial
underclaiming.
E. Inference from the Characteristics of Filed Claims
Still another strategy is to infer the merits of filed but undecided claims from the
characteristics of filed claims that were settled or decided on the merits.' For example,
it is reasonable to assume that, all else equal, claims with a greater probability of success
on the merits will command a higher settlement value than those with a lower prob-
ability of success. Eisenberg and Lanvers review evidence of the relationship between
case quality and settlement outcome and conclude that "the best available evidence is
that within-category settlement rates are highly sensitive to the merits of the case"
(2009, 124). If so, the characteristics and money values of settled claims can provide
some insight into how such claims might have fared had they instead been decided on
the merits. However, since the probability of success for different claims varies widely
and claims are not randomly selected for settlement or decision, this empirical strategy
requires a set of assumptions-a model-of the processes by which claims are settled or
pursued.
The economic literature assumes that potential legal claims are selected for liti-
gation based largely on their underlying merits as perceived by the parties. Given a
model of the mechanisms by which cases are selected for litigation-and there is no
consensus about the appropriate model (Bebchuk 1984; Shavell 1996; Waldfogel
1998)-it is possible, using knowledge of outcomes in decided claims, to estimate the
merits of claims that are filed but not decided.
For example, Siegelman and Waldfogel (1999) use data on groups of cases filed in
one federal district court to test a version of the model proposed by Priest and Klein
(1984). That model predicts both the plaintiff win rate in tried cases, and the rate at
which cases go to trial, as functions of three primitives: (1) the fraction of filed cases
that would yield pro-plaintiff verdicts if tried (the decision standard), (2) the ability of
the parties to estimate the quality of their own cases (uncertainty), and (3) the degree
of stakes asymmetry (the relative amount that each side stands to win or lose by virtue
of the litigation) between parties. Siegelman and Waldfogel test this model by collect-
ing data on six distinct types of disputes (e.g., contracts cases) and characterizing each
according to plausible proxies for the primitives in the Priest/Klein model. (For
example, the degree of stakes asymmetry is measured by the share of institutional
[nonindividual] parties among all plaintiffs and defendants, and by the proportion of
repeat players among these groups.) They then empirically estimate a structural version
of the Priest/Klein model, and compare the estimated parameters with their indepen-
dently gathered evidence. In general, the model tracks the independent evidence
relatively well. The authors conclude that if all filed cases were actually tried, plaintiffs
would win 0.8 percent of prisoner cases, 8.9 percent of civil rights cases, and 43.7
percent of contracts cases (Siegelman and Waldfogel 1999, Table 6). Other studies in
this vein include Kessler, Meites, and Miller (1996) and Eisenberg and Farber (1997).
5. We are grateful to a referee for suggesting this discussion.
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This kind of analysis has several limitations. First, it only helps estimate the merits
of filed cases, without having much-if anything-to say about claims that are never
brought (potential claims). Second, these estimates depend heavily on the model's
assumptions about the selection process, and in particular about the information avail-
able to parties and the process of settlement bargaining. These assumptions are not
directly testable.
Moreover, this approach has relatively little to say about the merits of potential
claims at lower levels of the dispute pyramid. Thus, suppose that if all filed prisoner cases
went to trial, plaintiffs would prevail in only 0.8 percent of them, as Siegelman and
Waldfogel (1999) estimate. Imagine a world in which 2,000 prisoners suffer sexual
abuse, but never file a claim because of fear, shame, or lack of resources. An additional
1,000 prisoners have complaints about food or conditions of incarceration, and of this
group, all file a claim. Two-hundred of these claims are formally adjudicated, and the
plaintiff prevails in two of them (1 percent). Even if the success rate in filed-but-not-
adjudicated claims is only 0.8 percent, this says nothing about the merits of the 2,000
potential claims that are never filed, which come from a completely different population
of disputes. Without sociolegal knowledge of the selection process, therefore, it is
impossible to make reliable inferences about the merits of unbrought claims based only
on information about decided cases.
IV. CONCLUSION
Underclaiming or overclaiming arguments assert that courts or other claims-
processing institutions see too few claims with merit or too many claims without merit.
This article has identified the conceptual structure of these arguments and canvassed
ways of estimating the merits of potential and actual claims.
In so doing, this article has also made it easier to separate valid underclaiming and
overclaiming arguments from ones that are largely stalking horses for or against the
purpose, scope, or morality of a claims-processing institution's rule of decision. Under-
claiming and overclaiming arguments have rhetorical power precisely because they
attempt to avoid debates about the propriety of an institution's decision rules, focusing
instead on the quality of claims brought under those rules. For example, it is much easier
for opponents of tort or civil rights laws to argue that the laws permit too many meritless
cases to be brought than to argue against the fundamental purpose of such laws. To be
sure, when assigning social values to underclaims and overclaims, valid underclaiming
and overclaiming arguments must ultimately face normative disputes about the purpose,
scope, and morality of a claims-processing institution's decision rules, and the tradeoffs
they may embody. Yet, by pursuing valid estimates of claim merit, we believe that
sociolegal research can substantially increase what we know, and more sharply identify
what we do not know, about how well claims-processing institutions encourage claims
with merit and discourage those without it.
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APPENDIX
One approach to claim valuation is to let each actual or potential claim's social
value vary completely with its probability of success on the merits, sum the resulting
values, and thereby generate a single probability-adjusted claiming value. Suppose we
survey a total of M individuals, and let:
I= if the jth person reports experiencing an injury, j = [1, M];
0 otherwise.
M
N = I
j=1
C 1 if the ith person makes a claim based on their own injury, j= [1, N;
0 otherwise.{ 1 if the ith reported claim actually judged to have merit;
0 otherwise.
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Fi = 1 if the ith reported claim actually judged to lack merit;
0 otherwise.
N
Ci = K = total reported claims
N
Si = T = total reported claims actually judged to have merit
i=1
, = V = total reported claims actually judged meritless.
By choosing N, not M, as the upper summation limit for C, S, and Fi, we ignore those
in the sample who did not perceive an injury. Moreover, because some reported claims
may be withdrawn before decision or decided on grounds that one may not treat as
decisions on the merits (e.g., dismissals on "procedural" grounds), T + V K.
To measure for underclaiming (U) and overclaiming (0), we discount each
reported injury by its probability of success on the merits (ps):
T
V
In theory, the final step is to sum those values (U + 0). This, however, requires
agreeing on cost-benefit functions for underclaims and overclaims, as discussed in
Section II.B. Absent agreement on how much to value underclaims and overclaims, we
cannot have a single probability-weighted claiming value.
